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A FEW STEPS
TOWARD AN
EXPLANATORY
THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Anthony D'Amato*
In the Preface to his recent book How International Law Works, Andrew T.
Guzman writes: "[w]hen teaching international law, one is confronted with
foundational questions from the very start of the course. Does international law
affect state behavior, and if so, how does it do so?"' Professor Guzman is too
reserved to say that international law simply lacks a theory that would answer and
explain these issues. To be sure, after four thousand years of being the sole and
exclusive set of legal rules among nations, it is nothing short of remarkable that
international law has not yet become thoroughly understood and explained.
In dogged search of an explanatory theory, Part I of this article is a critical
overview of today's most prominent theories of international law. Part II argues
that we must construct our theory upon a law that is enforceable and is enforced.
Finally, Part III discusses methodologies that should be taken into account in the
quest for an explanatory theory of international law.
Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
ix (2008).
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I. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT THEORIES
A. Fragmentation
As international law gains prominence in global discourse, its detractors claim
that if it were really law it would surely have a theory that explains where it comes
from, why and how it constrains state behavior, and why it deserves the name
"law." Such criticisms, repeated throughout the recent Bush Administration, have
succeeded in putting traditional scholars on the defensive. Many of these scholars
have already conceded, perhaps prematurely, that their subject is characterized by
a cacophony of partial theories that veer off in different directions. At a 2004
symposium, nearly all participants agreed that international law is ineluctably
fragmented.2 They despaired of ever seeing a theory that could glue all the pieces
together.3  Perhaps, some suggest, international law is just pluralistic. Yet
pluralism gives every topic of international law its own theory even if the
individual theories are mutually inconsistent. The problem of incoherence cannot
be cured by placing all the theories in one basket and calling it "international law."
An ensemble of more or less incoherent theories cannot itself be a theory.
Fragmentation may well be the biggest threat to the search for an overarching
explanatory theory of international law. Andrea Bianchi writes, "[t]he extreme
fragmentation of the theoretical discourse of international law may well lead to
normative relativism and eventually, to the demise of the system."4  Bianchi
concludes that fragmentation, because of its rebellious nihilistic appeal, could
erode the enthusiasm of young scholars who chose a career in international law in
order to help improve global governance and the condition of humankind.5
"Scholars must be aware that theory matters. ', 6
B. Theories as Chapter Headings
Until a few decades ago, it was rare for a scholar to worry whether international
law was really law, much less to be concerned about its lack of a sound theoretical
foundation. The classic treatises simply took as given a dozen basic principles
2. Symposium: Diversity or Cacophony? New Sources of Norms in International Law, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (2004).
3. Id.
4. Andrea Bianchi, Looking Ahead. International Law's Main Challenges, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392, 407 (David Armstrong, ed., 2009).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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such as the sanctity of state boundaries, the immunity of ambassadors, the right of
states to espouse the claims of their nationals, freedom of the seas, national
sovereignty over the territorial seas and superjacent airspace, the laws of war,
denials of justice and the responsibility of states for torts against neighboring
states. Principles such as these seemed to cover the entire field of discourse,
although there was always room to add a new one such as (somewhat grudgingly)
human rights. If everything was covered, what need was there for an overarching
theory? A few early twentieth-century scholars including T.J. Lawrence 7 and
Georg Schwarzenburger 8 tried to collate all the principles and turn them into
postulates on the model of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. 9 But
they were ultimately unable to show that the postulates were complete.1° As a
result, when today's scholars read the so-called treatises on international law, the
"theories" appear to be little more than chapter headings.
C. Reductionist Theories
Reductionism has also been a failure. Percy Corbett, for example, argued in
1925 that all international rules could be reduced to the voluntary consent of
states.'' But neither he nor others who later embraced the consent theory were able
to explain why customary international law was binding in the absence of specific
consent to its individual rules. Moreover, if consent supervened upon
enforceability-as the consent theory implied-there was no logical reason why a
state could not simply withdraw its consent to any particular rule whenever it
found the rule to impede its immediate interests.
A different flavor of reductionism was the late Myres McDougal's insistence
that all the rules of customary international law collapsed into a single word: "for
all types of controversies the one test that is invariably applied by decision-makers
is that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable standard of what, considering all
relevant policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as between the
7. See T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1919).
8. See GEORG SCHWARZENBURGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960).
9. See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (3
vols. 1925).
10. Cf KURT GODEL, ON FORMALLY UNDECIDABLE PROPOSITIONS OF PRINCIPIA
MATHEMATICA AND RELATED SYSTEMS (1996) (Translating Kurt Godel's findings that no
theory capable of expressing ordinary arithmetic, which might or might not include
ordinary language, can be complete).
11. See Percy Cobbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l. 20 (1925).
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parties."' 2 This rule, in McDougal's view, permitted nuclear testing by the United
States in the South Pacific but denied the same thing to the Soviet Union.' 3 The
latter, as McDougal thought everyone in the world would readily acknowledge,
was simply an unreasonable state. 14  But although McDougal's theory, as he
applied it, was supremely chauvinistic, American officials were not tempted to cite
it. For it was soon realized that if everything the United States did was by
definition reasonable (in domestic law, robbing a bank was reasonable from Willie
Sutton's point of view), 15 its positions on international rules would never be taken
seriously. 16
Martti Koskenniemi and David Kennedy have argued for a quite different kind
of reductionism. 17 They view international law as primarily a discourse that can be
deconstructed to reveal the antithetical argumentative positions of the competing
states that gave rise to a rule.' 8 Koskenniemi locates the antagonistic forces at
opposite ends of a spectrum that he labels apology and utopia. 19 While some of his
followers base their contentions on raw state practice, others opt for utopianism
where norms are conveniently found (morality, justice, security) that transcend the
empirical data.2 °
Although provocative on an academic level, it is hard to see how the
Koskenniemi-Kennedy reductionism would be of any help to international
lawyers.2' Koskenniemi himself concedes the impracticality of his theory.22 Not
only is his theory too abstract, but even on its own terms all international legal
discourse surely takes place somewhere in between apology and utopia. Neither
side would want to move too closely to either of the polar extremes for fear of
12. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 778 (1960).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. When Sutton was asked why he robbed banks, he famously and quite reasonably replied:
"[b]ecause that's where the money is."
16. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 223-29
(1971) (discussing the argument further).
17. See DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987).
18. Id.
19. See MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
20. Id.
21. David Kennedy, Tom Franck and the Manhattan School, 35 N.Y.U J. INT'L L. & POL. 397,
426 (2003) (revealing a story from Professor Kennedy who candidly recalls an incident
early in his teaching career at Harvard Law School when Professor Abram Chayes came
"bursting into [his] office to declaim, 'why would you want to deconstruct international
law, we've hardly got it constructed yet.').
22. See KENNEDY, supra note 17.
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conceding the majority of the spectral space to the other side. But the bottom line
is that any theory of law that is inapplicable to the practice of law can hardly be
called an explanatory theory.
D. Legal Realism
If traditionalists are concerned about the absence of a coherent theory to support
international law, proponents of American legal realism such as Myres McDougal,
W. Michael Reisman, Philip Trimble, John Carter, Jack Goldsmith, and Eric
Posner offer a facile way out. They argue generally that international law is
nothing but a set of strategic considerations that can often be usefully consulted in
the game of international power politics. Law does not constrain any state's
behavior; force is the only true constraint.
When Myres McDougal, a specialist in property law at Yale, decided to import
legal realism into the then moribund field of international law, 23 he formed an
interdisciplinary partnership with Harold D. Lasswell, a leading political-science
exponent of power politics. 24 They found common ground in their belief that a
rule of international law is nothing more than a helpful guide to relevant decisional
factors for officials whose job it is to project state power into the international
arena. This formula struck some of McDougal's international listeners in the 1950s
as a new idea, just as its resuscitation by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner 5 (who
betray no awareness of McDougal's massive work) has been honored as a new
idea.26
Through the ages, most lawyers, judges, and philosophers of law have
maintained that law regulates power. Even Hobbes and Machiavelli viewed the
purpose of law as regulating power. Only in the strange world of some legal
realists does power somehow regulate law. However, the idea of power regulating
law is incoherent; power has no internal structure that the word "regulate" could
describe. Indeed, Machiavelli took the analysis further, arguing that the Prince's
23. America's strict neutrality in the inter-war period nearly drove International Law out of the
law-school curriculum.
24. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936) (Giving
away in his most famous book his stance on power without even mentioning it in the title).
25. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
26. In fact, the pedigree of the "new idea" derives from the classical realists, Machiavelli and
Hobbes, who in turn probably found it in Socrates' dialogue with Thrasymachus. They
believed that rulers of states (the Prince, the Leviathan) wrote the laws to serve their own
interests and then revised them whenever they found the old ones to be inconvenient.
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personal power is enhanced by the rule of law. It is of limited value to a Prince or
Leviathan to be the strongest person in the jungle; his power will not extend much
beyond his fists. But where a population respects an orderly rule-governed society,
the Prince or Leviathan may achieve vast power. True, they have to appear to
follow the law that is on the books until they decide to change it (in order to
reassure their subjects that the law is doing its job of regulating power), but this is
a trivial cost compared to the power benefit that they derive from law in
consequence of its ability to radiate out and control public behavior on a large
scale.
Yet like fragmentation, legal realism has nihilistic appeal to legal scholars. And
like severe reductionism, legal realism fails in the courtroom or around the
negotiation table. Suppose in court an attorney argues that the plaintiff should win
because he is richer and more powerful than his opponent. In quick response, the
opposing attorney says that the plaintiffs attorney has now conceded that she does
not have good legal arguments-she has simply fallen back on the illogic of sticks,
stones, and guns. Similarly, in a negotiation, the side that claims it ought to win
because it is more powerful is not appealing to a neutral principle that has any
possibility of inducing the other side to yield argumentative ground. Only rules of
law-accepted ex ante as impersonal and neutral-have a chance of mediating
between opposed political adversaries.
Finally, ordinary language suggests that although power may back up the law,
power is not the same thing as the law. A striking example can be drawn from
archaic Rome. When Rome was vastly superior over the nations it wished to
conquer, it observed rules of battle and conquest that treated both sides equally.
27
Military power may be unequal, but international law treats states equally. For if
law were itself unequal, the weaker side could never be persuaded to obey it. The
weaker side might be forced to obey it, but in that case, we would be within the
domain of force and not of law.
E. Exceptionalism
Nevertheless, some American scholars, intoxicated perhaps by the fact that the
United States is now the world's sole superpower, claim that international law is
indeed unequal: it favors the United States.
27. ALAN WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME: WAR AND RELIGION 20-23
(1993).
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Neither Machiavelli nor Hobbes went so far as to claim that the laws on the
books should be differentially interpreted in favor of the more powerful party. For
although the Prince could change the law whenever it suited him, the law that was
in place-so long as it remained in place-was perceived to apply just as much to
him and his close friends as it applied to his subjects. Yet McDougal's student, W.
Michael Reisman, has taken the step that was too radical for Machiavelli and
Hobbes. Inasmuch as Reisman's voluminous writings are highly contextualized,
qualified and nuanced, exegesis is sometimes necessary to dig out their operative
message. Once extracted, the message is always the same: powerful states enjoy,
and ought to enjoy, an interpretive advantage if and when international law is cited
against them. On some occasions, notably at a meeting of the American Society of
International Law, Reisman candidly admits his power-based theory of law: the
notion of law as a body of rules, existing independently of decision-makers and
unchanged by their actions, is a necessary part of the intellectual and ideological
equipment of the political inferior.
28
Philip Trimble and John Carter have offered a modest retreat from the
unabashed exceptionalism of McDougal and Reisman. 29  They use the term
"domestication" to refer to the incorporation of an international norm into a state's
own legal system. 30 Only if and when a norm is domesticated does it become
binding on that state's officials and ministers. The Department of Justice's
infamous "torture memo" perhaps reflects the Trimble-Carter view in contending
that any alleged torture of prisoners by United States military personnel abroad is
governed by the meaning that United States law gives to the term "torture."
31
Thus, under the Trimble-Carter view, a rule of international law undergoes a
change of meaning when it is domesticated. Of course, if one can unilaterally
narrow down the definition of torture so that it does not include, say,
waterboarding, then former President George W. Bush could claim-as he did
28. W. Michael Reisman, Remarks at American Society of International Law Proceedings: The
Jurisprudence of International Law: Classic and Modem Views (Apr. 2, 1992), in 86 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992).
29. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(4 th ed. 2003) (the most widely adopted casebook in American law schools).
30. See the contribution of Phillip Trimble and the reply by Anthony D'Amato in ANTHONY
D'AMATO (ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 400-410 (1994).
31. See Memorandum for Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel to the President on Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. I, 2002) (on file with author),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf.
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claim-that the United States does not torture enemy prisoners. 32 However, there
is an obstacle to self-serving definitions: the words being redefined already have
settled meanings within the relevant linguistic community-in this case all the
nations party to the Convention on Torture.
33
Under Trimble-Carter, even multilateral treaties ratified by the United States,
such as the Geneva Conventions, can be more deformed than transformed when
they become part of United States law. Over time, the domestic meaning will
inevitably diverge from the international definition. If all 190 states domesticate
an international rule each in their own way, then, like the Cheshire cat, 34 the only
transnational law remaining is the grin.
If Reisman, Trimble, and Carter have left international law in critical condition,
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner seem eager to administer extreme unction. They
see no shadow of compulsion attached to any rule of international law. Rules are,
at best, mere suggestions for ways to cooperate with-or sometimes bamboozle-
other states. States only act for self-interested reasons; their self-interest is
determined by political, not legal, factors. On those occasions when a state
decides, in its self-interest, to cooperate with other states, it might look up a few
rules of international law to get a suggestion or two about how best to go about
cooperating. As Posner said in a recent debate, speaking for himself and
Goldsmith, "[t]he first point that we want to make is that the government should
never comply with international law just for the sake of international legality." 35
Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg replied that the Goldsmith-Posner conception "is not
law in anything other than the most misleading way." 36 Indeed, Goldsmith and
Posner do not define "international law" but simply substitute "international
strategies" whenever someone suggests that law is at work. In one respect,
however, their claim that international law lacks enforcement machinery requires a
response. The counter-argument that international law is a coercive system will be
32. President Bush said "This government does not torture people." See
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/ 0/05/bush.torture/index.html.
33. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85.
34. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1865).
35. Eric A Posner, Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub.
Policy and Research, Debate on the Limits of International Law (March 30, 2005)
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID. 1023/transcript.asp.
36. Douglas Ginsburg, Judge, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy and Research, Debate on the
Limits of International Law (March 30, 2005)
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventlD. 1023/transcript.asp.
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taken up below in Part II.
F. Soft Law
A simple view of a rule of law is that it consists of a norm sitting on top of a
sanction. The norm tells us what we must do; the sanction informs us of the
physical disability that will befall us if we disobey the norm. For theorists who
believe that international rules have no sanctions, the norm is the only thing
remaining if the rule is to be called "law" at all. The norm without the sanction is
called "soft law"; the norm-plus-sanction is called "hard law" or just simply "law."
Soft law has the distinction of being introduced to international lawyers by an
article that warned them against using it. In 1983, Prosper Weil published
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, deploring the use of soft law
to characterize some norms that are not legally binding but often considered
preferable to a failure to agree upon binding norms. 37 Weil's fear was that soft law
might act as a kind of strange attractor (not his terminology), pulling down
standard rules of international law to a lower level of non-bindingness. 38
Eight years before he wrote his article, a paradigm of soft law-the Helsinki
Accords of 1975-was concluded among thirty-five states including the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. 39 The text was written so as to sound as un-treaty-like as possible. It
was called a "Final Act of the Helsinki Conference" and not a Convention; it
contained "principles" not rules; the sections were called "baskets" not "Parts"; the
paragraphs spelling out the principles were not numbered; the principles were
entitled to "respect" and not to observance; and at the conclusion the parties
merely "[d]eclare their resolve, in the period following the Conference, to pay due
regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference." 40
Professor Weil's reaction to the Helsinki Accords was that of a traditional
international law scholar who was skeptical of any variations on the nature of
international law that might degrade the precarious position of law among
nations a.4  He felt that agreements like the Helsinki Accords might substitute
"relative normativity" (soft law) for the absolute normativity (hard law) of any
37. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normality in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413,
(1983).
38. See Id.
39. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
40. Id.
41. Weil, supra note 37.
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given rule of law.42
As international conferences go, the Helsinki Accords have been a considerable
success. Yet Professor Weil and his numerous followers must have been surprised
to find that as the Accords settled into global expectations of international
behavior, they did not de-legitimize other conferences that resulted in binding
multilateral treaties.43 Instead, the treaty conferences seem to have pulled up the
Helsinki Accords to a near-binding level. It is as if the theory of international law
abhors a vacuum-the empty space between enforceable norms and unenforceable
norms. Soft law resides (temporarily?) in that space; it is neither law nor non-law.
If this analogy to a vacuum is correct, soft law may be a precursor to hard law.
Soft law may simply be a norm looking to hitch onto a sanction. Dinah Shelton
observes that soft law may "precede and help form new customary international
law" and "form part of the subsequent state practice that can be utilized to interpret
,44treaties. Alas, these are not theoretical attributes of soft law, but rather a
selection of pragmatic influences. For soft law tends to come in paired opposites:
women (have, do not have) rights equal to men; women (have, do not have) a right
to an abortion; adults (have, do not have) a right to use drugs; people (may, may
not) be sentenced to capital punishment; adolescents (may, may not) be sentenced
to capital punishment; nations (have, do not have) a right to burn fossil fuels; the
Inuit (have, do not have) a right to kill bowhead whales. If some of these norms
are helping to form customary practice or to interpret treaties, their paired
opposites are working in the equal but opposite direction. The result is that on the
large scale soft law cancels itself out.
G. Reputational Sanction
A state may incur a cost when its reputation is damaged by its non-compliance
with a rule of international law. Andrew Guzman lists this "reputational sanction"
first in his account of compliance as a game that states play.45 However, when the
stakes are big enough, reputational damage is weak tea compared to national
interest as perceived by the state actor (as we saw in the earlier discussion of
42. Id.
43. The human rights baskets played a role in the implosion of the Soviet Union, while NATO
refrained from using its power to upset the national boundaries in Eastern Europe.
44. Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 72
(2009).
45. GUZMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
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nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific).46 But even when stakes are low,
President Franklin Roosevelt compared international relations to a game of poker
in which a certain degree of bluffing is necessary if a player wants to win in a
tournament or competition. Indeed, the best player not only bluffs, but
occasionally allows herself to be caught at bluffing-thus revealing to the other
players that at any time she may be raising their bet on just a bluff. If she had no
reputation for bluffing, the other players would "fold" when she raised their bets,
thus drastically reducing her potential gain over a series of hands.
Although reputational sanction is undoubtedly a factor that nations take into
account in playing the game of international diplomacy, it may be weak when the
stakes are high, and less effective when stakes are moderate or low than
occasionally taking a reputational "hit."
I1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IS ENFORCEABLE LAW
As we have seen so far, the sheer difficulty of finding an explanatory theory of
international law has led many scholars to reduce the meaning of the term
"international law" to a status below that of real law in order that their theories will
fit the redefinition. But once they redefine international law as something
involving less than force, the harder and more complicated it becomes to explain
why states obey it.
There is no need to search for a theory of international law that is based on
making it into something that is less than law, for a proof was made twenty-four
years ago and never challenged that international law is indeed enforced.47 In
Kelsen's words, law is a "coercive order. '48 International law is "law" like any
other kind of law.
A short and simplified version of the proof follows:
Suppose states A and B (loosely modeled on the United States and Iran) enter
into a bilateral treaty that contains five provisions of equal importance:
(1) sanctity of borders;
46. See McDOUGAL, supra note 12, at 778.
47. See Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"? 79 NW. U. L. R. 1293 (1985)
(In the sciences, a proof would invite attempts at falsification; if none succeeds, then the
proof would be taken as a step toward a better understanding of the world. Sadly,
international legal scholarship seems to work in the opposite direction. The more
convincing a proof, the more it is ignored, thus making room in journals for other writers to
invent their own proofs).
48. HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 19 (1949).
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(2) immunity of diplomatic personnel;
(3) protection of the other party's property;
(4) most-favored-nation treatment; and
(5) rights of nationals to travel in or do business in other party's state.
It is a tenet of the international customary law of treaty interpretation that if one
party to a bilateral treaty violates one of its important provisions, the other side is
released from all its obligations under the treaty. As set forth in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one
of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the
treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part."4 9 The treaty, in other
words, is a package deal; no state party can pick and choose the provisions it wants
to obey or disobey.
Now suppose that B abruptly arrests fifty of A's diplomatic personnel stationed
in B. What can state A do about this clear violation of provision (2) of the treaty?
State Aprobably would not want to denounce the entire treaty; after all, it was in
A's interest to sign the treaty.
Perhaps A could engage in reciprocal retaliation by arresting at least fifty of B's
diplomatic personnel. Tit-for-tat reciprocity is the oldest form of enforcement of
treaties as well as contracts-indeed down to the level of rules invented by
children in playgrounds. But it is also the weakest, because the initial violator
always knows that if he breaks a rule his opponent or competitor will certainly not
continue to follow that rule. Thus, an immediate cost of breaking a rule is
retaliatory breaking by the other side. We can therefore arrive at a logical
conclusion: whenever a state breaks a rule, tit-for-tat reciprocity fails as a
retaliatory strategy. If this conclusion seems strange, we should not forget that
most of the time states (or contractors or schoolchildren) do not disobey a rule
precisely because they are deterred by the likelihood of tit-for-tat retaliation.
In the real-life exemplar of the model we have been considering, Iran violated
the rule of diplomatic immunity in 1978 by arresting fifty American diplomats
stationed in Tehran. The immediate reaction of the media newscasters was that the
United States should retaliate by arresting at least fifty Iranian diplomats in
Washington DC and New York, but the State Department knew better. There had
just been a fundamentalist revolution in Iran that overthrew the government of the
Shah of Iran. The Iranian diplomats in the United States and other countries had
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(1980).
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all been appointed by the deposed Shah. The new regime of the Ayatollah
distrusted these persons, and indeed the United States would be doing the
Ayatollah a favor by arresting the Iranian diplomats. Hence, from the point of
view of the new Iranian government, violating provision (2) would not only be
costless but might also be profitable.
50
In the model, state A has available a third response: tit-for-a-different-tat. In
looking over the five provisions of the A-B treaty, A finds one whose violation
would disproportionately harm B. A's quick investigation shows that B's
sovereign funds are deposited primarily in banks in state A or in third-country
banks that have a working relationship with banks in state A. By contrast, hardly
any of A's sovereign wealth is on deposit in B's banks. Thus, the government of A
focuses on provision (3).
By an executive order freezing B's bank deposits in A, B is deprived of a
significant portion of its sovereign funds so long as it detains A's diplomats. In the
real-world archetype of this model, the United States froze $13 billion of Iran's
assets. In a little over a year, Iran returned the Americans unharmed, and the
United States lifted the freeze, after imposing a few conditions, upon the Iranian
bank deposits.
5
'
In the preceding model, the bilateral treaty between A and B became
enforceable due to the "package deal" nature of the treaty. Although A and B
might not have been able to agree on a treaty containing just one of the five
provisions in the model treaty, they were able to reach agreement that contained all
five because a provision that favored A would be set off by a provision that
favored B, and so forth. This model does not prove that a disagreement between A
and B will never lead to war, but it does tend to stave off war due to the inherent
stability of a package deal of this type. The proof shows that international law
operates to stabilize an international arena even in a world that consists of only two
states.
The core of the proof that international law is coercive has just been given:
coercion consists of taking away from a state a legal entitlement that would have
been respected had the state not violated the law. It is worth adding that there is no
need for the initial violation to be a treaty-breaker; a violation can occur within a
treaty and be punished within the treaty. This was the situation in the U.S.-France
50. This argument is expanded, with references, in D'Amato, op. cit. supra n. 47.
51. Id. at 1310-12.
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Air Service Award.5 2  France issued a regulation prohibiting American
intercontinental aircraft that stopped at Heathrow Airport to continue their flights
into DeGaulle Airport. The United States claimed, and France denied, that the
French regulation violated the Air Services Agreement of 1946. The United
States, thereupon, adopted a countermeasure: it prohibited French intercontinental
aircraft from landing in Los Angeles, in clear violation of the Air Services
Agreement. The countermeasure was economically more severe than the original
delict. " An arbitral tribunal held that the French action was a violation and the
American sanction was not excessive.
It should also be emphasized that tit-for-a-different-tat is not confined to treaty
violations; it works for international law generally. This was already seen in the
real-world exemplar of the A-B diplomatic hostages model in which neither Iran
nor the United States asserted rights under a mutually binding bilateral or
multilateral treaty. International customary law is itself a package deal: all its rules
apply to all states equally, and all rules must be observed on pain of tit-for-a-
different-tat retaliation. 54 In all cases the retaliation must be proportionate to the
initial violation; otherwise the retaliation itself would constitute a wholly new
violation.
55
One might ask why so little attention has been paid by scholars of international
law to enforcement by tit-for-a-different-tat retaliation. If enforcement is an
everyday phenomenon, why are there so few instances of it in the literature? The
explanation is simple: most instances of retaliation and countermeasures are
deliberately hidden for sound diplomatic reason. Consider the following generic
example.
An American businessperson skilled in construction supervision goes to state X
to set up a construction company and recruit local workers. He does all the
52. Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946, U.S.-Fr., 9 Dec. 1978, 54
INT'L L. REP. 304.
53. See generally, Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration-or Both? The 1978 United
States-France Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1980); ELISABETH ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES,
72-73, 96-98 (1984).
54. In the formative days of international law, states consented to its rules by the treaty process.
But as the number of nations increased, new states were simply taken to have acceded to
international legal custom irrespective of their intent or consent.
55. See generally Thomas Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International
Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (2008); Supremacy of Territorial Sovereign, Jurisdiction, 2
John Bassett Moore DIG. OF INT'L L. § 179, at 24-30; Inviolability of Territory, Plea of
Necessary Self-Defense, Destruction of the Caroline, 2 John Bassett Moore DIG. OF INT'L
L. §217, at 409-414 (the Webster-Ashburton correspondence regarding the Caroline case).
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necessary paperwork, recruits workers, and is ready to start business. But at the
last minute a local governmental official approaches him and demands a large sum
of money to permit the businessperson to commence business operations. The
entrepreneur refuses, not only because this unexpected payment would wipe out
any profit he might have expected from the construction job, but also because
bribery of foreign officials is illegal under American law. Late that night, three
men enter his hotel room by key and in the dark, brutally gag and blindfold him,
beat him many times, take all his money and personal property including a laptop
with all his business data, and finally leave. No words were spoken. It takes him
several hours to work his way free. On the desk he sees his passport, a few dollars,
and a one-way airline ticket out of the country. Back in Washington D.C., he tells
his story to a sympathetic State Department official who states, "Yours is not the
first case where this kind of thing has happened. Since you have no evidence,
unfortunately the government and the courts can do nothing for you."
About ten days later, the Minister of Trade of state X arrives at JFK Airport on
his way to attend a top-level meeting at the United Nations. He is waved through
customs, as is normal for foreign dignitaries, but then a security guard says the
Chief of Security would like to have a word with him. He is led into an office
where he is arrested. He is not allowed to make any telephone calls "for security
reasons." Despite his vehement protests, he is led into a small holding cell where
he spends the next twenty-four hours, missing his meeting in New York City. He
is still furious when the Chief of Security comes to his cell to apologize profusely
and personally sets him free. Apparently, there was a computer error; his name
and profile fit that of a wanted terrorist. He is treated to a nice meal and escorted
to a plane that takes him back to state X.
Back home, he demands that the United States should be made to pay
reparations to him for their negligence in programming their own computers. The
Minister of Defense replies that it was probably not a computer error and the best
thing to do would be to forget the entire incident. He then recounts what happened
to an American entrepreneur ten days earlier.
If, by chance, a small story appeared in the Washington Post about a
businessman who claimed maltreatment in state X, and two weeks later a small
story appeared in the New York Times about a computer glitch at the JFK
terminal, it is extremely unlikely that a person who happened to read both stories
would think they were connected to each other.
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III. A FEW METHODOLOGIES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
THEORY
A. Evolutionary Epistemology
Rules of international law are not top-down; they were not handed down from
God to Grotius. Instead they emerged bottom-up from interactions among the
early states. Research can begin with the earliest extant diplomatic records: the
treaties among small states in ancient northeast Africa and southwest Asia whose
clay molds have been recovered by archeologists. The cultures represented include
Egyptian, Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Hittite, Aramean, and Israelite.5
6
Some provisions recurred in many of these treaties, even among states that were
far apart and did not communicate with each other. These common provisions
included:
(1) demarcation of state boundaries;
(2) sanctity of boundaries;
(3) safe passage of emissaries;
(4) diplomatic immunity;
(5) everlasting peace; and
(6) duty to return fugitives to their home state.
In some treaties there was even a rudimentary rule of treaty interpretation that
over time developed into a default rule of customary international law. For
instance, a clay-tablet treaty between the kingdom of Hatti and the Land of the
Seha River in 1350 B.C. provided that if any of the signatory kings "do not
observe" the words of the tablet, or "turn away," or "alter" these words, then some
fifty oath gods named in the treaty "shall eradicate from the Dark Earth" the king,
his wives, his sons, his grandsons, his household, his land, his infantry, his horses,
and all his possessions .
A number of the ancient treaties were treaties of peace. Peace treaties are not
coercive signings, as is sometimes assumed; rather they reflect egalitarian trade-
offs as to the bundle of provisions in the treaty. The proof is simple: if A is
winning its war against B, A has the choice of either continuing the war to the
bitter end and annexing B or discontinuing the hostilities with B's consent. A
truce may serve the interests of both sides when B's continued military resistance
56. See, e.g., GARY BECKMAN, HIT7ITE DIPLOMATIC TEXTS (2d ed. 1999).
57. Id. at 86 (This could be history's first expression of Justice Scalia's theory of originalist
interpretation).
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is causing too much deadweight loss. For example, Hitler in 1940 could have
defeated France a few weeks earlier if he had bombed Paris. But he decided not to
do so based on the quite reasonable calculation that Paris soon would be his. What
is less obvious, but part of the same game-theoretic equation, is that the French
army in retreat might have burned Paris, thus denying it to Hitler. Thus one of the
reasons Hitler invited early peace talks with the French government was to avoid
the deadweight loss of Paris that could have been inflicted by either the dejected
French army or the hotheaded German blitzkriegers. And the French, for their
part, voluntarily agreed to the peace talks as a preferable alternative to continuing
the war.
The ancient Hittite treaties contain a number of provisions that we now regard
as part of customary international law. But the treaties themselves do not tell us
how any particular rule of custom got started. Although we must accept the
historical record as a baseline, we immediately find that there are gaps in the
record regarding the formative processes of customary law. There is need for a
theory to fill or interpolate these gaps.
B. Inference to the Best Explanation.
Explaining how rules got started is quite similar to the task confronting
evolutionary biologists of explaining how species got started. It is an oft-lamented
Darwinian fact that the fossil record does not contain evidence of the stages by
which one species mutated into another. Instead, paleontologists have to explain
the abrupt appearances of new species, the scarcity of transitional fossils, and the
apparent differences in morphology between ancestral and daughter species. By
scientific consensus, the only reasonable methodology available to fill in the gaps
is inference to the best explanation. 58 Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species itself
is the leading book-length example of such an inference. Similarly, in
international legal history, the record does not reveal how any rules, including the
first one, got started. But it does tell us that rules did get started and, moreover,
that many of them were fit enough to survive the vicissitudes of international
conflict.
As a possible illustration of inferring to the best explanation of how the first
rule of international law arose, we may begin by asking which norms logically
presuppose the existence of other norms. A moment's reflection shows that all
58. See PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (2d ed. 2004).
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norms presuppose the existence of lines of communication between governments.
We then ask how communication itself gets started. We take a minimalist
scenario: a world consisting of just two states, A and B. We assume that they are
at war. There is no open line of communication between them and, perforce, no
rule that they both respect. If A sends an envoy into B's territory to discuss terms
of truce, B is likely to kill the messenger. Assuming that this happened many
times, we simply have a blank historical record. So far, we cannot account for the
rise of any international rule.
But there is the possibility of a mutational event. For example, at one point in
historical time a messenger from A somehow manages to persuade the king of B
not to kill him but to hold him hostage, and meanwhile, send the king's own
messenger back to A with a response to A's proposed terms of truce. Then, upon
receiving B's messenger, the king of A might in turn hold him hostage and send
into B a third messenger with a response to B's reply. The reiterations become
increasingly error-prone until it occurs to everyone that it would be more efficient
if a group of A's envoys were to reside in a protected enclave in B and a group of
B's envoys were to reside in A. Then messengers from both groups could go back
and forth, sending, receiving, translating and delivering messages. To secure the
process, both sides agree to grant immunity to all envoys. Each enclave is then
called an "embassy." As a result, even before terms of the treaty of truce (or of
peace) are agreed upon, the first rule of international law has been established-the
rule of diplomatic immunity. The survival of this rule over thousands of years is
evidence of its fitness as an all-purpose facilitator for the peaceful settlement of
disputes.
C. Taxonomy of Rules.
Legal rules, both domestic and international, may be helpfully analyzed by a
three-part taxonomy. Type I rules, the category that most people immediately
think of as "law," address the behavior of persons, entities, and states. These rules
tell their subjects what to do or not do in order to avoid punishment. Type II rules
are addressed to rule-enforcers. In domestic law the rule enforcers are the police;
in international law, the rule enforcers are all the states that are not directly
involved in a given dispute or controversy (the tit-for-a-different-tat process).59
59. See generally, H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994) (Author inexplicably
omits enforcement-type rules. The result is that his two remaining types (corresponding to
Type I and Type 3 in the present text) seem to be functionally overloaded); see also
A Few Steps Toward an Explanatory Theory ofInternational Law
Finally, Type III rules, which are often called constitutive rules or meta-rules,
address all the other rules. They provide for the creation, modification, change, or
deletion of Type I and Type II rules. In international law, Type III rules operate
through the constitutive processes of treaty-making and custom. Of course the
labels suggested here are unimportant; what matters is that a new theory of
international law takes into account the important differences between the types of
rules.6 °
D. Non-Zero-Sum Game Theory
Two recent books on international-law theory, referred to earlier in this Article,
employ zero-sum games to help illuminate the role of international law in
international relations.61 They each make extensive use of variations on the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, Goldsmith and Posner more so than Guzman. But that
game, though appearing to involve three persons (the District Attorney and the two
prisoners), in fact, is only a two-person zero-sum game involving two prisoners
who are not allowed to communicate with each other. It is thus an impoverished
version of international relations, which perhaps accounts for the Goldsmith-
Posner conclusion that the international-law factor (roughly corresponding to the
District Attorney) cancels out. 62
To see why an N-person non-zero-sum game is necessary for modeling the role
of international law in international relations, let us begin with a simple world of
just two states. They are necessarily playing a two-person zero-sum game.
Suppose A and B adopt a rule of freedom of the seas. If A then seizes one of B's
military vessels on the high seas, A will have inflicted upon B, at least in theory,
two injuries: a strategic injury to B's navy, and a legal injury to B's stake in the
existing rule of freedom of the seas. Yet, when there are only two players, the two
types of injuries are congruent-they merge into each other. The seizure of the
KELSEN, supra note 48 (Kelsen made the same omission but it is more consequential in
Hart's theory because of the primacy he accords to rules as a source of rules).
60. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 27-55 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing the argument in further detail).
61. See GUZMAN, supra note 1; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 25.
62. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 25 (Goldsmith and Posner use two-person game theory
to try to prove that international law is just politics. Although they do not deny that there
are more than two states in the world, they retrofit most of their real-world examples into
two-person games, a game of United States vs. Others. However, it is clear that their choice
of two-person game theory assumes the very result they believe they have proved-that
international rules can be wholly deconstructed into power-strategic choices.).
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ship is ipsofacto the destruction of the rule. State A cannot credibly say to B that
it only intends to violate the rule this one time-from here on out the rule remains
in place. As a result, in their small bilateral world, A and B are forever poised at
the tipping point of war.
A non-zero-sum model of the international legal system would make a decisive
theoretical difference. More states have to join the system, as historically they did;
at the present time there are 193 states. It is clear that international relations
involves both conflict and cooperation, even in the stark case of a war. The laws
of armed conflict (war crimes, crimes against humanity) operate in game-theoretic
terms as an element of cooperation in the conduct of the armed conflict. In
peacetime, the economic theory of Division of Labor and its international
counterpart the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 63 result in an increase in the
wealth of nations. Since all nations want to increase their wealth (and well-being)
above all other things-conflict is just one possible way to increase a nation's
wealth-it is obvious that the role international law plays in promoting cooperation
among states (laws of peace) is at least as important as its role in preventing or
downsizing conflict (humanitarian law). In any event, international law is a mixed
game of conflict and cooperation.
Thus in our two-state model we add state C. Now the two types of interests-
the strategic interest and the legal interest-do not necessarily merge. States A and
B may view the seizure of B's ship as simultaneously a strategic and legal injury to
B, as they did in the previous bipolar world. But now the new player, state C, may
view with indifference the strategic interest yet may care very much about
preserving the integrity of the rule of freedom of the seas. This result can be
generalized as we add more states to the world. States that have no direct political
interest in the fortunes of either A or B are nevertheless interested in not allowing
A or B to destroy a rule of international law. Since international law nearly always
confers a benefit upon neutral states, there is a community-wide interest in rule-
preservation. In short, if we add one state or many states to the bipolar world we
started with, we can conclude that the game-theoretic model for the system can
only be a non-zero-sum game.
Even so, the international legal system is strengthened as new states come
aboard. To demonstrate this corollary to the general non-zero-sum thesis, let us
63. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION 143-53 (1949); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN
ECONOMY AND STATE 82 (1962) (explaining wealth is created by an exchange "where each
party has a superiority in productivity in regard to one of the goods exchanged").
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start with a three-state world. It is possible that C might have a strategic/political
interest in supporting A's position. C's strategic interest may, thus, outweigh its
other interest in the preservation of the rule. In that case, the game has become a
two-person zero-sum game, with A and C on one side and B on the other side.
International law will then diminish or disappear as a factor in this three-cornered
world. 64 The obvious cure is to add more states. Today, with approximately 193
states in the world, it is increasingly unlikely that any combination of strategic
interests will outweigh the interest of neutral states ("third states") in the
preservation of rules of international law. 65 As far as a theory of international law
is concerned, it is almost guaranteed that today the game-theoretic model will be
an N-person non-zero-sum game.
E. Network Theory
Karl Popper famously insisted that studying a subject requires demarcating it
from all other subjects, otherwise, considerations around the edges of one subject
would blend into another subject, muddying the entire analysis. 66 His advice as
applied to law suggests that legal rules should be distinguished from rules of
etiquette, propriety, prudence, morality, strategy, civic virtue, and even soft law. 67
For only with respect to full-fledged legal rules is the state clearly committed to
their integral preservation by the use of coercion.
Demarcation has an unexpected payoff for international law: it allows the
application of network theory to the entire set of legal rules. In H.L.A. Hart's
well-known example, the state may not care if a gentleman fails to remove his hat
in church; no legal rule is implicated. 68 But the state does care when one person
64. Note however that B might be militarily as strong as the A-C alliance. Consider in this
connection the game of Balance of Power played by Great Britain in the nineteenth century.
Whenever two opposing political coalitions formed on the continent, Great Britain would
align itself militarily with the weaker coalition. This is a classic example of preventing war
by entering into strategic alliances. However, balance-of-power politics is outside the aegis
of international law.
65. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (The
International Court of Justice implicitly refers to the weight given to rules per se in its
discussion of obligations erga omnes-duties that states owe to all other states and not just
the state injured in a bilateral dispute. Moreover, the concept ofjus cogens is inexplicable
in a world of two states. Rather, it can be viewed as a form of rule-protection by third states
(i.e., third states will not regard as valid any bilateral agreement that violates a peremptory
norm)).
66. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIc OF SCIENTIFIc DISCOVERY 4-15 (1959).
67. See Id.
68. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 9 (2D ED. 1994).
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shoplifts or another commits serial murders. What is significant in justifying the
applicability of network theory is the fact that the state usually makes no
qualitative distinction between these two rule-violations. Although it is likely that
the state will expend greater resources in apprehending and convicting the serial
killer as compared to the shoplifter, this additional investment can be explained by
the different magnitudes of the crimes. That difference is quantitative, not
qualitative. The decisive test occurs when A and B violate the same rule and A is
quiet about it while B publicly flouts his violation. It is universally known that the
police and prosecutors will expend far more resources in tracking down and
incarcerating B. They do so because B, by openly violating one rule, has attacked
and injured the integrity of the network of rules.
A network of legal rules is a non-scalar network.69 The relation between rules
is measured by a power law rather than by a bell-curve distribution. These
characteristics give rise to an additional useful heuristic. We may predict that the
set of legal rules, like any non-scalar network, sets up an inverse power-law
relation between the magnitude and frequency of rule violations. 70 As the legal
system gains experience in dealing with minor rule violations that do not risk a
world war, then when rarer major violations come along, lines of communication
and procedures of diplomatic adjustment are in place and can be extended to those
(less frequent) major violations. Over time, a smooth gradient is established that
can reduce the disruptiveness of violations. The relative ease of repairing minor
violations, thus, promotes overall systemic stability. In turn, the stability itself
recursively makes it easier to repair major rule violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
If any one sentence about international law has stood the test of time, it is Louis
Henkin's: "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.'
If this is true, why is this true? What makes it true? How do nations invent
rules that then turn around and bind them? Are international rules simply
pragmatic and expedient? Or do they embody values such as the need for
international cooperation? Is international law a mixed game of conflict and
69. See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASi, LINKED (2002).
70. For example, earthquakes measuring 6 on the Richter scale are twice as powerful as those
measuring 3, but they occur only half as often.
71. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
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cooperation because of its rules, or do its rules make it a game of conflict and
cooperation? It is hard to imagine a set of rules in all of human history that is more
important and less understood than the rules of international law.
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